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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the role of the federal government in
infrastructure planning and finance. Four major arguments for federal
infrastructure engagement policy are advanced: (1) equalization of
intergovernmental and interregional imbalances, (2) response to tax-base
changes, (3) response to recession, (4) revenue dependency of the state and
local governments. The conclusion is that, due to the magnitude of
expenditure requirements for upgrading and maintaining public-works
facilities in the United States, neither state and local governments nor
the private sector can effectively solve the current infrastructure
problems. The federal government will have to assume a vital role in
equalizing interregional disparaties, stabilizing tax-base changes, and
reducing the effects of inflation and recession on the construction,
rehabilitation, and maintenance of capital stock. Finally, the federal
government, with the collaboration of the lower-level governments and the
private sector, will gradually have to design and implement a national
infrastructure capital plan.
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THE DECLINE OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND
THE FEDERAL-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
by
Ahmad Sharbatoghlie
Over the past several years, considerable attention has focused on the
condition of public infrastructure in the United States. The concern over
the deteriorating bridges, dams, public transportation, water supply and
sewer systems, and so on. has been growing because of the increasing
frequency of breakdowns of these public works. In July 1982, for instance,
300,000 residents of Jersey City, New Jersey, went without drinking water
for three days, following the rupture of an 80-year-old aqueduct (New York
Times, 1982, p. 54). In June 1982, Research and Forecasts, Inc., stated
that if one of the two tunnels that supply water to the city (built in 1927
and 1936) were to collapse, evacuation of more than three million persons
might be required (Copeland, 1983, p. 4). Similarly, in a study conducted
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2,884 of 9,000 dams inspected, were
found unsafe. The unsafe dams included 132 needing emergency action to
prevent imminent collapse (Copeland, 1983, p. 4). Another story that has
drawn the attention of millions is a cover story in Newsweek (Beck et al.,
1982) on the subject of aging and neglected public-works facilities.
In addition, analysts using case studies have pointed to the urgency
of infrastructure planning. A study requested by the Joint Economic
Committee of the U.S. Congress, for example, was made by analysts in 23
states. One conclusion was that there is a gap between anticipated revenues
and basic infrastructure needs, approaching $450 billion through the year
2000 (U.S. Joint Economic Committee, 1984). Other estimates of the
potential price tag run as high as an incredible $2-3 trillion (Choate,
1982). It now seems to be reasonable to assume that, though not indicating
an imminent, widespread failure of the national capital plant, there exists
a significant deterioration in the U.S. economic infrastructure.
The perceived breakdown of the existing facilities leads to a
fundamental political-financial question: which level of government should
have the responsibility for financing the needed reconstruction,
rehabilitation, and maintenance costs, given the fiscal capacities of
federal, state, and local governments? The issue of responsibility sharing
is of primary importance in the context of the present study. To put it in
different words, should the federal government delegate most of the
responsibility of maintaining public-works facilities to states and
localities or to the private sector, or should it either maintain the
status quo or assume more responsibility?
In the following sections, we will discuss some of the key issues
behind a constructive federal-engagement policy.
RATIONALE FOR FEDERAL-GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
There is a little doubt that the deterioration of the infrastructure
condition is truly a national phenomenon. The dispute between policy
makers and planners is on the extent to which the federal government should
be involved in rectifying this problem. In this section, we will present
the rationale behind the federal-government involvement in national
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infrastructure planning.
The federal government is attempting to limit or, in some cases,
drastically reduce or completely eliminate the federal role in
infrastructure planning and finance. The central theme of the present
paper is that the restoration of the U.S. capital plant cannot be carried
out without active federal infrastructure policy. Four arguments support
federal government involvement: (1) equalization of intergovernmental and
interregional imbalances, (2) response to tax base changes, (3) response to
recessions, (4) revenue dependency of the state and local governments.
Each of these will be discussed in the following sections.
Equalization of Intergovernmental and Interregional Imbalances
The foremost argument for federal involvement in the infrastructure
crisis is the need for equalization. The rationale is to redress the
inequality in revenue-raising capacity both between various levels of
government and between different regions in the country. In the following
sections, the intergovernmental inequality (vertical imbalance) and
interregional inequality (horizontal imbalance) will be discussed.
Intergovernmental Inequality in Revenue-Raising Capacity
An intergovernmental imbalance exists within a federal system when
one level of government enjoys robust taxation capacity while other levels
suffer from anemic taxation capacity. Analysts have therefore advocated
that the federal tax system be used to finance state and local governments,
which have weaker taxing systems.
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As will be shown, vertical fiscal imbalance in the source of funds
between different levels of government has grown recently. This imbalance
reflects federal use of a progressive income tax, which responds readily to
economic growth, as the major revenue source. On the other hand, state and
local governments, which are responsible for most domestic nonmilitary
expenditures, rely on the less income-elastic property and sales taxes.
Bish and Nourse (1975) have shown empirically that the personal income tax
has an elasticity coefficient of about 1.65, indicating that receipts rise
more rapidly than incomes; the general sales tax has a revenue-elasticity
coefficient of 1.00, indicating that taxes are proportional to incomes; and
the local property tax has an estimated revenue-elasticity coefficient of
only 0.80, indicating that tax receipts rise more slowly than incomes.
Given these facts, there is a need for federal grants to mitigate vertical
fiscal imbalances between federal, state, and local governments. Indeed,
according to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR),
vertical balance was one of the reasons behind the general revenue-sharing
program, which was enacted in 1972 (ACIR, 1982a, pp. 1-15).
An ideal federal system should have strong partnership patterns. In
practice, however, enormous differences exist in the ability of the
federal, state, and local governments to raise revenue. The supporters of
federal general-revenue sharing in the United States argue that, while the
revenues of the federal system were increasing because of high income taxes
during the last two decades, many state and local governments had major
fiscal problems. Proponents further argue that the more jurisdictions a
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government embraces, the less vulnerable it is to interjurisdictional tax
competition and the higher it can set its top rate (ACIR, 1982b, p. 3). In
other words, the federal government has near monopoly control over the
personal income tax, giving it greater revenue-raising power than state or
local governments. In a situation where large-scale capital investment is
required to rebuild and maintain the deteriorating infrastructure,
retaining control over the power to tax personal incomes while delegating
the financial responsibility of infrastructure to the lower levels of
government will perpetuate the problem instead of curing it.
Interregional Inequality in Revenue Raising Capacity
In addition to the above reason for the federal involvement, states
differ in the capacity to raise adequate revenues for maintaining and
rehabilitating their public works. Understanding fiscal capacities helps
in two ways: first, it provides quantitative information necessary for
designing and administering the grants-in-aid used by the federal
government to carry out its redistributive function, and, second, it forces
states and localities to examine and determine their potential tax-base in
order to finance public services. Traditionally, the basic objective of
improving the measures of fiscal capacity has been to enhance the
effectiveness of public policy specifically designed to ameliorate
interjurisdictional fiscal disparities. A number of programs, such as
General Revenue Sharing (GRS), Medicaid, and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), have grants that are inversely related to some measure of
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state and local fiscal capacity. In this respect, the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) went on record in 1964 as favoring
the recognition of relative inequalities among the states in the
distribution of federal grants to the states. The Commission therefore
endorsed "fiscal equalization" as an objective of federal grant policy
(ACIR, 1964).
Broadly defined, fiscal capacity refers to the ability of a
government to finance public services from its own sources. Stein (1985)
is currently analyzing different methodologies for measuring fiscal
capacity related to infrastructure. He identifies many ways of measuring
fiscal capacity of a state or local government. The federal government
uses personal income as a measure of fiscal capacity for grant programs
that are intended to provide some equalization. The justification for
employing personal income as a measure of fiscal capacity is that, for the
nation as a whole, national income is the total resources available to meet
both public-sector and private-sector demands for goods and services.
According to the ACIR, "this holds for the public sector simply because
regardless of whether the tax is levied on income, sales, property, or
some other base--it is generally paid from current income" (ACIR, 1982a,
p. 5).
Another measure of fiscal capacity is the Representative Tax System
(RTS) approach. Under RTS, tax capacity is estimated from the amount of
revenue each state (and its local governments) would raise if each state
used identical tax rates (ACIR, 1982a, p. 11). The ACIR rates are
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"representative" in that they are the national averages for each base. In
addition, the state-by-state tax practices--such as exemptions or partial
assessment--do not affect the measured capacity.
Regardless of which measure is chosen, substantial differences exist
in state fiscal capacity. Table 1 shows the fiscal-capacity estimates for
the per capita income and representative tax systems. The estimates are
indexed with the use of the national tax-capacity per capita for the years
1967, 1975, 1977, and 1979. The national tax capacity is 100. An index of
113 (Wyoming), for example, shows that the state has 13 percent more tax
capacity than the nation as a whole for that year.
Note that both the tax-capacity and per-capita income indicators
point to substantial variation among regions. In the case of the tax-
capacity index, the 1979 values range from 71 (Mississippi) to 215
(Alaska); the standard deviation is 24.4. When weighted by population, the
standard deviation is 14.3. The states with the greatest tax capacities
are Alaska (215), Wyoming (179), and Nevada (164); Their high values
reflect their ability to tax income earned in their state by people living
elsewhere. In contrast, Mississippi (71), Alabama (76), and South Carolina
(77) have the lowest tax capacities. The disparities among states are more
apparent when the indices are expressed in dollars. The average state had
a per-capita tax capacity of $884 in 1979. The tax capacity of the
highest state (Alaska, $1,903 per capita) was three times that of the
poorest state (Mississippi, $628 per capita).
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Table 1
FISCAL-CAPACITY MEASURES: PER CAPITA INCOME AND THE
REPRESENTATIVE TAX SYSTEM, BY STATE, 1967-1979.
Tax Capacity Per Capita Income
State 1979 1977 1975 1967 1979 1977 1975 1967
New England
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Vermont
Mideast
Delaware
D.C.
Maryland
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Great Lakes
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
Plains
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
93
106
80
91
97
84
86
93
111
107
98
101
87
92
103
112
97
102
99
96
101
106
107
102
95
96
106
92
95
107
82
92
102
87
92
97
122
118
100
104
91
98
104
112
100
103
103
97
98
104
104
98
94
99
97
89
97
108
84
95
103
88
94
99
125
115
100
107
96
97
103
112
97
99
103
96
100
105
108
96
95
104
100
93
101
117
81
98
110
91
88
103
123
121
101
107
108
91
104
114
99
104
100
94
100
104
105
95
97
110
92
91
102
115
80
101
95
97
84
104
106
120
106
111
104
98
104
112
98
107
99
97
98
100
105
101
94
99
94
85
102
114
81
102
94
96
83
106
109
127
108
112
106
99
105
114
98
108
101
96
96
98
100
101
93
95
84
83
103
116
81
104
93
97
84
109
112
124
109
116
111
100
103
115
96
103
98
96
98
101
102
99
93
100
101
85
109
129
81
109
97
103
90
113
117
119
107
120
119
100
106
117
99
107
102
97
94
95
96
96
95
93
81
81
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Table 1, continued
Tax Capacity Per Capita Income
State 1979 1977 1975 1967 1979 1977 1975 1967
Southeast
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia
Southwest
Arizona
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Texas
Rocky Mountains
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Utah
Wyoming
Far West
California
Nevada
Oregon
Washington
Alaska
Hawaii
U.S. Average
89
76
78
104
83
86
108
71
82
77
81
93
95
116
95
105
113
122
108
111
91
111
88
179
115
116
164
105
103
215
105
100
88
77
79
104
85
84
103
71
83
78
83
90
90
111
92
101
105
116
105
109
88
103
90
159
113
114
155
104
101
154
107
100
89
77
79
104
86
86
102
71
84
78
84
93
89
110
94
94
103
116
104
107
89
103
88
162
110
111
149
100
98
159
109
100
82
70
77
104
80
80
94
64
78
64
78
86
75
98
95
94
102
98
101
104
91
105
87
141
121
124
171
106
112
99
99
100
87
79
79
97
87
84
86
70
84
80
84
98
84
98
96
86
97
100
95
104
86
88
82
113
113
115
120
102
109
128
105
100
86
80
78
96
86
85
85
71
84
80
83
98
85
95
92
83
91
98
95
102
88
87
84
108
112
114
117
102
107
149
109
86
79
77
96
86
83
82
69
84
80
82
98
85
93
92
83
89
95
95
102
89
92
84
105
111
112
113
98
107
165
115
100 100
D.C. = District of Columbia
SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1983, Tax Capacity
of Fifty States. M-134. Washington DC: Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations.
79
71
69
90
82
76
80
62
79
73
77
91
76
87
86
77
84
88
89
96
82
86
82
95
113
115
112
97
104
116
110
100
-10-
Although differences exist between the indices of per-capita income
and the representative tax-system, the correlation coefficients between
income and tax capacity show a moderate-to-strong relationship between the
measures: 0.70 in 1977, 0.77 in 1977, 0.76 in 1975, and 0.70 in 1967 (ACIR,
1982a, p. 26).
The point is that states differ widely in fiscal capacity. States
with high energy resources, mineral reserves, or considerable tourism will
have less difficulty raising revenues for infrastructure needs than those
with the opposite characteristics. Yet, states with few or no mineral
reserves, a small amount of tourism, and a restricted tax base--the states
with the most fiscal difficulty--will suffer the most from the recent cuts
in federal grants-in-aid.
Interregional Fiscal Inequality: An Empirical Illustration
The following analysis will help us further document the
interregional fiscal disparity discussed in the previous sections. We have
used the data on the 1982 tax capacity of fifty states developed by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1982b, pp. 15-
44). The data contain 31 tax-bases (e.g., general sales tax, corporate
income tax, personal income tax, etc.) for the 50 states (Appendix I). A
tax base or tax base proxy "is a measure of the resources available for
taxation under a particular tax." (ACIR, 1982b, p. 15). The following tax
bases were used: personal income tax, corporate income tax, and oil and gas
severance tax. In addition, states were compared on the basis of three
composite variables (i.e. variables consisting of several revenue sources,
-11-
as opposed to a tax-base which indicate a single revenue source): per capita
government finances, per capita tax revenue, and income. Appendix I
contains the 1982 tax-capacity data for the fifty states, organized by 31
tax bases. The three composite variables are given in the first three
columns. The primary reason for the selection of these variables is that
combined they show the revenue-raising potential of states. Also, the four
tax bases of general sales, personal income, corporate income, and oil and
gas severance were selected both because of their importance as a revenue
source and also because of the availability of combined tax-base figures.
However, a more elaborate analysis is desired before we can draw any causal
relationships. This section, therefore, is only designed to show the
existence of an imbalance and inequality between different states in their
potential revenue sources.
Table 2 shows the average, minimum, maximum, range, and standard
deviation associated with the above variables. The uneven ability of the
states in raising revenues is reflected in the length of the range and the
magnitude of standard deviation. Among states, the per capita financing of
public projects varied from $1,068 (Arkansas) to $14,735 (Alaska). Per
capita tax revenues also differed significantly among states. The difference
between the state with the lowest per capita tax revenue of $730
(Arkansas) and the state with the highest per capita tax revenue of $6,998
(Alaska) is $6,268. The gap between different states is also evidenced
when individual tax bases, instead of the composite variables, are compared.
The general sales tax base varies from about $106 billion in taxable goods
in California to about $2 billion in Vermount. The personal income tax
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Table 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SELECTIVE TAX BASES
Tax Base Average Minimum Maximum Range S.D.*
PCGF 1,884 1,068 14,735 13,667 1,885
PCTR 1,254 730 6,998 6,268 877
INCOME 47,168 4,497 288,481 283,984 54,905
GSALES 105,931,318 2,133,190 103,798,128 101,664,938 1.9787E7**
PITAX 5,432,356 466,379 31,720,188 31,253,809 6.44167E6
CITAX 2,800 241 16,857 16,616 3,454
OGSEVER 2,241,076 0 42,611,540 42,611,540 6.54042E6
*Standard Deviation
**1.9787 raised to the 7th power, or 19,787,000, etc.
Note: Variable names are as follows: PCGF = Per Capita Government
Finances; PCTR = Per Capita Tax Revenue; INCOME = Income;
PITAX = Personal Income Tax; CITAX = Corporate Income Tax;
OGSEVER = Oil and Gas Severance Tax.
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base has a range of about $31 billion and standard deviation of 19,787,000,
and the corporate income tax base has a range of about $16 million and
standard deviation of 3,454; each signifies a wide disparity in the
revenue-generating capacity of the states.
In order to illustrate visually the distribution of the above
variables, we have used thematic mapping (Maps 1 through 3). These maps
are constructed by first digitizing the map of fifty states and then
creating a matrix composed of three variables (column entries) with fifty
states (row entries). Of many possible maps, we have only drawn the maps
associated only with the following variables: income, general sales tax, and
oil and gas severance tax. The selection of the above three variables is
due to their significance as indicators of revenue-generating capacity of
the states and the availability of combined figures. The variable income
is the state 1982 income. Because of the particular configuration of the
multimap software used to generate the maps, we had to cluster the states
into intervals. The intervals are shown in the lower left corner of each
map with the respective legends.
These maps show a wide disparity in the fiscal capacity of the
states. Map 1 shows the income distribution of states. The income
disparity of states is evidenced when we compare the legends of the income
intervals. Whereas California ($288 billion), Texas ($158 billion),
Illinois ($133 billion), etc. fall into the $60,000-$288,481 billion
interval, Vermont ($4 billion), Wyoming ($5.7 billion), Idaho ($8.6
billion), etc. are in the $0-$14,999 billion interval. In terms of the
United States of Aerica
NM
15099,0-29999,9
.9-14999,8
Map 1: Income Distribution
SOURCE: Calculations and map generations are based on the 1982 data on tax-bases provided
in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985, Tax Capacity of
Fifty States. M-142. Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernental
Relations, pp. 15-44.
United States of America
33000,0-49999,0
1080.2-32999,0
,0-9999,0
Map 2: General Sales Tax Distribution
DATA SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985, Tax Capacity of
Fifty States. M-142. Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations, pp. 15-44.
Inited States of America
OIL & GAS TAX (1000 5)
6.0-999.0
.0-5.9
Map 3: Oil and Gas Tax Distribution
DATA SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985, Tax Capacity of
Fifty States. M-142. Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, pp. 15-44.
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individual tax base, the gap between the states is also evident. In Map 2,
for example, California with about $106 billion sales tax contrasts with
Vermont with only about $2 billion in sales tax. In Map 3 where the
distribution of oil and gas severance tax is shown, Texas, California,
Louisiana, and Oklahoma fall in the $5-$43 billion interval, but Maine,
Idaho, Georgia, and Vermont fall into $0-$6 million interval. Texas with
$42.6 billion in taxable oil and gas production has far greater potential
to generate revenues for the state and local governments than a state like
Maine with no taxes obtainable from oil and gas production.
The fiscal diversity among state and local governments also can be
seen in the comparative revenues and expenditures data. As Table 3 shows,
the national 1980 average of state-local tax revenues as a percentage of
personal income was 11.6 percent. However, Table 3 also shows that in
fourteen states, total tax revenues as a percent of personal income fell
somewhere between 10 and 11 percent; in two states this percentage exceeded
16. Table 4 presents 1980 expenditures-per-capita data. Once again
diversity is evident. In five states, expenditures per capita is less than
$1,300. Seventeen states, however, spent more than $1,700 per capita. The
U.S. average state-local expenditures per capita was $1,622.
The role of the federal government is particularly significant when
we compare the state interregional revenue sources. Among the various
sources of revenue, such as property tax, individual income tax, corporate
income taxes, and federal aid, the revenue received from the federal
government had a comparatively low level of variation; it has been
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historically a more stable source of revenue. Table 5 shows the variation
in the percentage distribution of revenue sources by state and local
governments in the years 1953 and 1975. The major elements of the revenue
structure are listed in column 1. Column 2 shows the percentage
distribution of various tax sources.
Property taxes, on the average, contributed 32.0 percent of total
state-local revenue in 1953; corporate income taxes contributed 2.4
percent. Interstate variability in reliance on various taxes is measured
by relating the mean value shown in column 2 to the standard deviation
around these mean values. Dividing the standard deviation by the mean
provides the coefficient of variation, which assists in comparing
variability of taxes having different means. In 1953, the tax with the
highest coefficient of variation was the corporate income tax (106.1
percent), while the tax with the lowest coefficient of variation was the
sales tax (24.8 percent). Columns 5, 6, and 7 show the interstate
variability in 1975 revenue from own sources. In 1975, federal aid had the
lowest coefficient of variation (17.8). Because investment in capital plant
and infrastructure requires a stable and long-term revenue source, a low
coefficient of variation in the federal aid indicates a logically
significant source for capital-expenditure financing.
The above discussion centered on the issue of equalization as one of
the four major reasons behind the federal government involvement in
infrastructure planning and finance. In the next section, the second
argument for a federal role is presented.
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Table 3
STATE-LOCAL TAX REVENUES AS A PERCENT OF PERSONAL INCOME, 1980
Tax Revenue as a Percentage Number of
of Personal Income States
(Percent)
8.01- 9.0 1
9.01-10.0 8
10.01-11.0 14
11.01-12.0 12 (a)
12.01-13.0 8
13.01-14.0 3
14.01-15.0 2
15.01-16.0 0
16.01-17.0 1
17.01-18.0 0
18.01-over (b) 1
50
(a) 11.6% U.S. average
(b) Alaska: 36.8%
SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1979, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1980-81, Washington, DC, Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, p. 34.
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Table 4
STATE-LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, 1979-1980
Expenditures Number of
Per Capita States
(Dollars)
1,101-1,200 1
1,201-1,300 4
1,301-1,400 8
1,401-1,500 6
1,501-1,600 10
1,601-1,700 4
1,701-1,800 5
1,801-1,900 8 (a)
1,901-2,000 1
2,001-over (b) 3
50
(a) $1,622 U.S. average.
(b) Alaska: $6,257 per capita.
SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1979, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism 1980-81, Washington, DC, Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, p. 17.
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Table 5
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE SOURCES
BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1953, 1975
(Percent)
1953 1975
Coeffi- Coeffi-
Standard cient of Standard cient of
Revenue Source Mean Deviation Variation Mean Deviation Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property taxes 32.0 10.3 32.3 20.2 7.8 38.4
Individual
Income taxes 3.3 3.5 105.6 8.3 5.5 65.9
Corporate
Income taxes 2.4 2.5 106.1 2.5 1.2 49.7
General sales &
gross receipts 9.4 7.7 81.9 12.3 5.6 45.8
Selective sales &
gross receipts 16.3 4.0 24.8 9.6 2.7 28.0
Miscellaneous
taxes 10.1 3.7 36.5 5.8 3.3 56.7
Charges and
miscellaneous
revenues 13.4 3.6 27.1 18.8 3.7 19.8
Federal aid 12.9 4.4 34.3 22.7 4.0 17.8
SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1983. Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism 1976-77, M-110, Washington, DC:
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 33-40.
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Response to Tax-Base Changes
We will discuss state and local revenues before focusing attention
on the levels and determinants of municipal spending on public works.
Today people recognize that large cities may be in fiscal difficulty not
because their expenditures are too high in an absolute sense, but because
their expenditures are high relative to their ability to raise revenues.
Two of the most fundamental factors affecting the ability of state and
local governments to generate revenues for needed construction, repair, and
maintenance are (1) the standard of the permanent tax base and (2) the
change (expansion/contraction) of the tax base.
The tax or fiscal base can be permanent (e.g., natural resources) or
mobile (e.g., firms and people). Changes in the tax base can have both
positive and negative effects on infrastructure financing. Large northern
cities, like New York City, that face out-migration of industries and the
professional middle class, are confronted with a crisis in public finance,
in general, and infrastructure finance, in particular. On the other hand,
many southern and western cities have expanded their revenues from a
growing tax base.
In order to avoid confusion, let us explain how this argument holds.
This section is not intended to show whether or not there has been
migration from the cities to the suburbs or from the North to the South
(although such movements have taken place). The point is that large-scale
changes in the tax base affects state and local tax capacity. When a state
faces economic expansion (e.g., new plants, larger service sector, larger
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labor force, etc.), the ability of the state government to raise additional
revenues from a growing tax base also increases. The location of the state
is unimportant.
In contrast, large-scale contraction of-the tax base can have two
negative effects: (1) it reduces the tax capacity, and (2) creates
inefficiencies due to waste as industries close down and people move from
one state to another. These effects provide justification for the federal
government to provide a regional stimulus in the form of grant-in-aid
programs. The theory of planned adjustment assumes that local
deterioration of infrastructure and economic malaise persists precisely
because competitive forces do not create an efficient spatial distribution
of economic activity due to market imperfections. One of the roles of the
federal government is to overcome deficiencies in the market system by
planning for changes in the infrastructure (transportation, sewer, and
water systems) of the lagging regions so that they become self-sustaining,
retain their population, and attract investment.
In order to show that the change of the tax base is not an isolated
phenomenon, but rather is taking place on a national scale, we will examine
two patterns of change: city-to-suburb population shifts and changes of the
tax base in the Sunbelt and the Snowbelt regions.
City-Suburb Demographic Changes
Large-scale changes in the demographic composition of cities and
states can accentuate regional disparities. Such shifts can drain cities
and states of some of their most productive tax bases. Information from
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the 1980 decennial census and from the 1977 economic censuses indicates the
extent of the recent city/suburb demographic changes. Table 6 shows the
city-suburban population shifts.
Between 1970 and 1980, the number of people residing within
designated Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) increased from
almost 140 million to about 170 million, which represents a 22 percent
increase. The rate of growth of suburban population, on the other hand,
exceeded that of central cities by a wide margin. The number of persons
living in central cities, for instance, increased from 64 million to only
68 million between 1970 and 1980, a gain of about 6 percent; whereas those
living in metropolitan suburbs increased from 75 million to more than 100
million, a gain of about 33 percent. By 1977, the declining cities
accounted for only 47 percent of metropolitan-area service-industry
receipts, 27 percent of metropolitan retail sales, and 35 percent of
metropolitan manufacturing jobs.
Snowbelt-Sunbelt Demographic and Economic Shifts
Regional shifts of population and economic activities can have
tremendous effects on the ability of the state and local governments to
finance and deliver adequate public services. An understanding of the
linkages between regional shifts in employment and population, the
unemployment problems of large cities, and fiscal problems of state and
local governments is essential to formulating an intelligent public policy
(Bahl, 1984).
-25-
Table 6
CITY-SUBURBAN POPULATION SHIFTS
1950 THROUGH 1980
Population
1950 1960 1970 1980
(millions)
Total U.S. Population 151.4 179.3 203.2 226.5
Inside SMSAs 84.9 112.9 139.4 169.4
In Central Cities 49.7 58.0 63.8 67.9
Outside Central Cities 35.2 54.9 75.6 101.5
Outside SMSAs 66.5 66.4 63.8 57.1
SOURCE: Kamer, Pearl M. 1983. Crisis in Urban Public Finance: A Case Study
of Thirty-Eight Cities. New York: Praeger, p. 29.
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The fiscal consequences to cities of suburbanization were
exacerbated by the concomitant shift of population, sales, and jobs from
the North to the South and West. As shown in Table 7, between 1940 and
1980, the Sunbelt increased its population by 112.3 percent. Over the same
period, the combined northeastern and midwestern regions, often called
"Snowbelt" or "Frostbelt", grew by only 41.9 percent. In terms of economic
performance of the northern and southern cities, the contrast is again
evident. The northern cities accounted for 39 percent of metropolitan-area
service-industry receipts, 22 percent of metropolitan retail sales, and 26
percent of metropolitan manufacturing employment. By contrast, the southern
cities accounted for 72 percent of metropolitan-area, service-industry
receipts, 52 percent of metropolitan retail sales, and 59 percent of
metropolitan manufacturing jobs (Kamer, 1983).
Table 8 shows the interregional employment shifts in the period 1960
through 1980. The indexes of employment change show that the Southern and
Western regions enjoyed higher economic expansions than the Northeast and
Northcentral regions. For the 1960-1970 period, the index of employment
change was 63 in the Northeast, 84 in the Midwest, 138 in the South, and
134 in the West. For the 1970-80 period, the index of employment change
was only 34 in the Northeast and 66 in the Midwest, as compared with 153 in
the South and 171 in the West.
During the 1970s, the rate of employment growth in the western states
was 171 percent of the national average. As a result, the share of U.S.
nonfarm jobs in the Sunbelt increased from less than 42 percent in 1960 to
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Table 7
POPULATION OF THE SUNBELT, 1940, 1960, 1980
(IN THOUSANDS)
Increase Increase
1940-1980 1960-1980
State 1940 1960 1980 (Percent) (Percent)
North Carolina 3,572 4,556 5,874 64.5 28.9
South Carolina 1,900 2,383 3,119 64.2 30.9
Georgia 3,124 3,943 5,464 75.0 38.6
Florida 1,897 4,952 9,740 413.4 96.7
Alabama 2,833 3,267 3,890 37.3 19.1
Mississippi 2,184 2,178 2,521 15.5 15.7
Tennessee 2,916 3,567 4,591 57.5 28.7
Louisiana 2,364 3,257 4,204 77.9 29.1
Arkansas 1,949 1,786 2,286 17.3 28.0
Oklahoma 2,336 2,328 3,025 29.5 29.9
Texas 6,415 9,580 14,228 121.8 48.5
New Mexico 532 951 1,300 144.8 36.7
Arizona 499 1,302 2,718 444.7 108.8
Southern Nevada (a) 16 127 461 2,781.2 263.0
Southern California (b) 3,481 9,399 13,803 259.4 46.9
Subtotal 36,378 53,576 77,224 112.3 44.1
Northeast-Midwest 76,120 96,927 107,986 41.9 11.4
U.S. Total 132,165 179,323 226,505 71.4 26.3
(a) Clark County (Las Vegas Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area).
(b) San Bernadino, Kern, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Los Angles,
Orange, San Diego, Ventura, and Imperial counties.
Riverside,
SOURCE: Adopted from Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, 1983, Sunbelt
Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II. Austin, Texas:
University of Texas Press, p. 2.
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Table 8
INTERREGIONAL EMPLOYMENT SHIFTS
1960 THROUGH 1980
Index of Change, 1960-70 Index of Change, 1970-80
Total Manufacturing Total Manufacturing
Census Regions Employment Employment Employment Employment
Northeast 63 3 34 *
New England 74 2 72 87
Middle Atlantic 60 3 22 *
North Central 84 89 66 *
East North Central 82 77 53 *
West North Central 90 144 100 235
South 138 248 153 350
South Atlantic 150 206 138 243
East South Central 126 288 123 248
West South Central 127 311 198 688
West 134 128 171 602
Mountain 136 245 240 103
Pacific 133 110 151 523
U.S. Total 100 100 100 100
Note: U.S. growth rate = 100
*denotes an absolute decline.
SOURCE: Kamer, Pearl M. 1983, Crisis in Urban Public Finance: A Case Study
of Thirty-Eight Cities. New York: Praeger, p. 36.
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more than 51 percent in 1980. As shown in Table 8, the poor employment
performance in the Northeast was largely attributable to declines in
manufacturing employment. During the 1970s, in the Middle Atlantic states,
the underpinnings of the industrial base in the Northeast appeared to
disintegrate. Rising energy costs rendered northern manufacturing plants
obsolete at an increasingly rapid pace and forced many of them to close.
Kamer (1983) provides the following facts. Between 1960 and 1970,
the nation gained 2.6 million wage and salary jobs in manufacturing, 70
percent of them in the South and West. Between 1970 and 1980, the nation
gained only 1.0 million manufacturing jobs. However, whereas the South and
West gained 1.7 million manufacturing jobs, the Northeast and Midwest
collectively lost 680 thousand such jobs. As a result, the share of U.S.
manufacturing employment in the Sunbelt increased from 34 percent in 1960
to 45 percent in 1980. Had employment in the northern states increased at
a rate equivalent to the national rate of increase between 1960 and 1980,
the North would have gained an estimated 8.7 million additional jobs,
including 2.3 million manufacturing jobs.
Historically, the federal government has played an important role in
setting into motion the interregional movements of factors of production.
Undoubtedly, national demographic and economic trends, which may be called
exogenous variables, exert serious effects on the tax base of a state or
locality. These trends are beyond the control of the individual city or
state. They are phenomena of national scope. James (1981) and others
argue that federal programs and policies re-enforced private-market
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decisions to move from the city to the suburbs and from the North to the
South. James, for instance, contends that by offering greater subsidies
for the construction of new highways than for the maintenance of existing
ones, the federal government, in effect, forced "...built-up areas with
established transport systems.. .to bear a higher proportion of the costs of
their transportation" (James, 1981, p. 46). These built-up areas were
located primarily in the North. Other federal-spending programs also
helped the Sunbelt states.
Army Corp of Engineers' waterway projects opened southern
cities to international trade. The proliferation of Federal
defense installations in the south helped create new consumer
and industrial markets there....Tax laws also facilitated
industrial development in the sunbelt states... .In effect,
government tax policy encouraged business to invest in growing
areas, such as sunbelt states, and to withdraw from older,
established northern industrial areas. (Kamer, 1983, p. 39)
Bernard and Rice (1983), in a thorough study of Sunbelt cities,
provide the following reasons for the significant growth of these
metropolitan areas since World War II: defense spending (especially that
generated by the World War II), other federal outlays, a favorable business
climate, and an attractive quality of life. According to the authors,
federal defense policy before the war had not been especially favorable to
the South and the West when it came to the allocation of military
installations and the letting of contracts for weaponary and other
hardware. Industrial areas in the Northeast and Midwest received most of
the bases and, to an even greater extent, most production contracts. With
the start of World War II, the armed forces relocated their personnel and
training facilities around the country in order to make bombing and even
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invasion more difficult for the enemy forces. The chief beneficiaries of
this policy shift were the South and the West.
Warm weather coastal cities became centers of naval
construction and land-based operations, causing such places as
Mobile, San Diego, and Tampa to suddenly overflow with
shipbuilders and sailors. Mobile, wrote John Dos Passos in
1943, looked like "a city that's been taken by storm." Inland
cities of the South and Southwest offered wide-open spaces for
ground forces training and airplane production and maintenance
and clear skies for airplane testing and flight training. New
Orleans, Atlanta, Fort Worth, Oklahoma City, San Antonio,
Albuquerque, and Phoenix were among the many locales to
prosper thanks to the construction of aircraft production
facilities and the location or expansion of military bases
(Bernard and Rice, 1983, p. 12).
Largely as a result of federal military expenditures, the cities of the
South and the West experienced the greatest growth of population. Between
1940 and 1943, defense contractors issued calls for massive numbers of new
workers, and the military inducted and trained people for World War II. In
those early years, the population in the metropolitan counties of the South
grew by 3.9 percent and of the West by 2.7 percent. In contrast, the
metropolitan counties of the Northeast suffered a net loss of population of
0.6 percent (Funigiello, 1978, pp. 12-13).
The crucial role of the federal government in stimulating growth in
the South and West cannot be underestimated. Given the fact that major
problems of infrastructure failure can be traced to the older regions of
the Northeast and Midwest, and the fact that the federal government was
instrumental in heavily subsidizing the new construction in the South and
the West, it seems to be unfair to withdraw support for infrastructure
construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation in the former regions.
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The role of the federal government is particularly important when
regions manifest high tax-base changes. Changes in the tax base may
have a serious effect on the revenue-generating ability of states and
localities faced with tax-base contraction. Tax-base contractions may have
two simultaneous effects on the revenue sources of the state and local
governments. First, it may result in a substantial decrease in the own-
source revenue of the state/local governments. Second, it may restrain the
ability of the taxing authorities to raise taxes, because any attempt at
increasing tax rates will exacerbate the tax-base contraction process by
further reducing the rate of return on factors of production (Hansen, 1973;
Richardson, 1979; Schwartz, 1973; Tiebout, 1956). Therefore, the lower
levels of government are often reluctant to increase taxes on mobile
factors of production. Similarly, taxes on output will be detrimental to
the extent that they cause a deflection of sales from the levying
jurisdiction to a neighboring one or an out-migration of factors of
production. The decentralization of taxing powers may thus be strongly
limited by the disincentives to levy taxes to finance infrastructure
expenditures.
Response to Recessions
Recession causes changes in the fiscal capacity of states and also
elicits countercyclical programs, both of which are reasons for the
important federal government role.
Fiscal Capacity
The deterioration of the fiscal health of the states can also be
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traced to recessions (depressions). As will be shown, periods of recession
widen the gap between revenues and expenditures. During recessions, firms
tend to reduce activities relatively more where operating costs are higher
and where physical plant is oldest (i.e., in declining regions generally
and in central cities specifically). The process does not reverse itself
during the recovery (Birch, 1981; Bahl, 1982). Plant and employment
expansions tend to occur where comparative costs are lowest. Lower
comparative costs depends on a number of factors including lower energy
costs, lower factory-to-market transport costs, lower wage rates, and lower
taxes, all of which tend to occur in the South and West. The fiscal
problem of a central city is multiplied if it is located in the Northeast
or industrial Midwest, where plant is old or obsolete, energy is more
costly, transport and labor costs are high, climate is unfavorable, and
taxes tend to be comparatively high (Mollenkopf, 1981; Schmenner, 1978;
Richardson, 1979). In such circumstances, delegation of massive capital-
plant-restoration expenditures from the federal government to states and
localities with declining revenues will further accentuate the decline
process.
Although economic forecasters during the last two years stated that
the economy is growing and the recession ending, many states have yet to
recover (National Governors' Association, 1983). In fact, Table 9 shows
that in Fiscal Year (FY) 1983 more states implemented budget-reduction
strategies than in FY 1982: 27 states implemented across-the-board cuts in
FY 1983, up from 17 in FY 1982; 12 additional states implemented selective
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Table 9
SUMMARY CHART (50 STATES) VARIOUS AUSTERITY MEASURES
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Measure 1982 1983
Across-the-Board Cuts 17 27
Selective Program Cuts 25 37
Permanent Revenue Increases 12 27
Temporary Revenue Raising Measures 14 24
Capital Finance to Bonds 5 6
Move General Funds to:
Special Funds 8 17
Other Government Entities 1 3
Unpaid Employees Furloughs 4 9
Hiring Limits 37 42
Layoffs 20 22
Restricted Travel:
Out-of-State 24 32
In-State 16 23
SOURCE: National Governors' Association. 1983. Governors' Response to Fiscal
Austerity. Washington, DC: National Governors' Association of State
Budget Officers (August).
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program cuts. In addition, 27 states enacted permanent tax increases, and
24 states enacted temporary revenue-enhancement measures. Similarly, a
survey of the National Governors' Association and the National Association
of State Budget Officers provides further evidence of state financial
problems when it reports that the aggregate surplus for state governments
was $4.7 billion in FY 1981, $2.3 billion in FY 1982, but only $0.5 billion
in FY 1983 (Data Resources, Inc., 1983). Some of these austerity measures
and decline of revenues are due to recessionary forces, and a significant
part is due to the reductions in federal grants-in-aid programs.
One way the federal government has used to respond to recessions has
been to enact public-works legislation.
Countercyclical Programs
Historically, public works have been responsible for the creation
both of many physical facilities and of a large number of jobs in the
construction of roads, dams, bridges, waterways, and the like across the
country. Two types of employment effects of public works are important:
(1) the short-run employment effects resulting from the construction
activity and the demand for materials and (2) the long-run employment
effects, including the operation and maintenance of public facilities. In
both types, the federal government has been the principle instigator and
conductor of such employment-generating schemes. During the first three
years of the Great Depression, unemployment grew rapidly, reaching its peak
of 24 percent in 1932. Furthermore, private-construction activities
dropped from $8.7 billion in 1929 to $1.4 billion in 1932. Under these
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circumstances, the Emergency Relief Construction Act (1932) was passed. It
led to employment of about 3 million of the 13 million unemployed (Jerrett
and Barocci, 1979, p. 3). Similarly, federal establishment of the Civil
Works Administration (CWA) led to the direct employment of over 4.3 million
persons in the first six weeks of CWA's projects. Other federal-sponsored
programs include the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which
appropriated $3.3 billion for the Public Works Administration (PWA). The
intentions behind the PWA were (1) to prepare public works programs to be
undertaken as necessary, (2) to provide employment for workers in building
trades and industries supplying construction materials, and (3) to
stimulate industry by creating demand for construction materials (Jerrett
and Barocci, 1979, p.5). Although these programs were primarily intended
to alleviate unemployment, they also produced a staggering amount of
output.
For example, the CWA was responsible for building and/or repairing
over 500,000 miles of roads, 40,000 schools, 3,500 playgrounds and
althletic fields, and 1,000 airports. It also employed over 5,000
teachers and "pumped" approximately $1 billion into the economy.
Over its life, the WPA spent an average of $1.4 billion a year on
wages going to over 2 million families. The "small useful
projects" created over 617,000 miles of roads, 120,000 public
buildings, 124,000 bridges, and LaGuardia Airport (Fournier, 1983,
p. 14).
During the last two decades, other federally supported infrastructure
programs (such as the 1962 Accelerated Public Works Programs, 1971 Public
Works Impact Program, 1974 Job Opportunities Program, and 1976 local public
works program) were designed to serve a three-fold function: economic
stabilization, work relief, and construction of needed projects.
In summary, recession and countercyclical characteristics of public-
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works facilities are two important reasons for the federal government
involvement in constructing a national infrastructure policy. In the next
section, the final argument for the federal infrastructure engagement
policy, namely, the historical revenue dependency of the state and local
governments, will be discussed.
Revenue Dependency of the State and Local Governments
The current trends of federal withdrawal from infrastructure
investment and further delegation of authority to the state and local
governments raises two important questions. First, how will the state and
local governments react to the delegation of responsibility? Second, will
they do a better job than the federal government in promoting a healthy
infrastructure? In order to answer these questions, we will first look at
the state and local government expenditures on infrastructure during the
last two decades, and then we will discuss the past and the present federal
aid policy.
State and Local Infrastructure Expenditures Trends
The two most significant infrastructure expenditures trends of the
past two decades are, first, an increasing dependence of state and local
governments on federal-aid, and, second, a persistent decline in real
levels of state and local government capital outlays. For every 1 percent
increase in gross national product between 1954 and 1976, federal general
revenues grew by about 1 percent, state and local government revenues from
own sources by about 2 precent, and federal aid by about 5 percent (Bahl,
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1984, p. 14). With this trend came a growing reliance by state and local
governments on federal aid. Table 10 shows that, by 1978, federal aid
accounted for 22 percent of total state and local government revenues; it
was a more important state and local financing source than property, sales,
or income taxes. During the 1970s, federal aid for capital-outlays doubled
its share of support for state and local government capital-facility
purchases (from 20 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 1981) and more than
tripled in absolute dollars of support.
The second trend observable in the infrastructure realm is the
overall reduction in expenditures. Table 11 shows the steep decline in the
share of state/local budgets devoted to capital expenditures, from 27.1
percent in 1960 to 15.7 percent in 1979.
Table 12 shows the percentage of state and local government capital
outlay by major functions. The fact that the functions of sewerage, water,
and transit have slight percentage increases over the years should not lead
to the conclusion that the lower levels of government have increased their
overall role in capital expenditures. The reason is that the slight
increases in the three infrastructure functions coincide with a decrease
over time in expenditures pertaining to functions of highway and education.
Here the issue of trade-offs in expenditures between different functions of
infrastructure (and also other functions, such as education, social
welfare, etc.) emerges. That is, given the fiscal constraints of state and
local governments, the more money spent on one function of infrastructure
(e.g., because of a sudden failure), the less is available for other,
equally important, functions.
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Table 10
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES FROM FEDERAL AID
AND MAJOR TAX REVENUE SOURCES, 1954-1981.
Percent of Total General Revenue
Federal Property Income Sales
Year Aid Taxes Taxes Taxes
1954
1964
1974
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
10.3
14.7
20.1
21.7
21.9
22.0
21.8
21.7
21.3
34.4
31.0
23.0
22.3
21.9
21.0
18.9
17.9
17.7
6.6
8.0
12.3
12.3
13.4
13.9
14.3
14.5
14.3
25.1
23.1
22.2
21.3
21.2
21.4
21.6
20.9
20.3
SOURCE: Roy Bahl, 1984, Financing State and Local Government in
the 1980s. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 15.
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Table 11
STATE AND LOCAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, 1960-1979.
Fiscal Gross Capital Percentage of
Year Investment Total Expenditures
(millions) (percent)
1960 $13.5 27.1
1965 20.1 26.8
1970 28.8 21.8
1975 41.8 18.0
1976 39.9 15.9
1977 39.0 14.4
1978 46.7 15.7
1979 50.8 15.7
SOURCE: George Peterson and Mary Miller.
Infrastructure. Washington, DC:
1981, Financing Options for Urban
The Urban Institute, p. 6.
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Table 12
PERCENT OF STATE AND LOCAL CAPITAL OUTLAY
BY FUNCTION, 1970-1980
Total
Fiscal Capital
Year Expendi- Educa-
Ending Tures Tion Highway Sewerage Water Transit Other
1970 100 25.6 36.4 4.7 4.0 1.3 28.0
1971 100 24.5 36.0 5.1 3.6 1.2 29.6
1972 100 23.4 36.0 6.1 3.8 1.2 29.5
1973 100 22.4 32.6 6.8 4.0 3.5 31.7
1974 100 22.0 32.0 6.8 4.5 2.4 32.3
1975 100 22.1 30.4 8.0 4.7 2.7 32.1
1976 100 21.7 30.5 8.6 4.7 2.8 31.7
1977 100 20.5 27.8 9.4 5.1 3.6 33.6
1978 100 19.4 28.8 9.8 4.7 3.0 34.3
1979 100 17.9 29.3 10.5 5.1 3.0 34.2
1980 100 17.0 30.4 10.0 5.2 3.0 34.4
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1982. Governmental Finances, Series GF.
U.S. Government Printing Office, annual issues.Washington, DC:
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Table 13 shows the government expenditures for fixed capital
investment in current and constant dollars. Between 1968 and 1977, real
levels of capital spending by state and local governments fell almost 30
percent. Although there has been some recovery from the 1977 low of capital
spending, expenditures have remained well below the levels of the last half
of the 1960s and first half of the 1970s.
Tables 10-13, make it evident that the state and local governments
have developed high levels of federal aid dependency for their capital
expenditures. Now that federal aid is beginning to shrink, state and local
governments would have problems enough were their task merely to find
substitute sources to finance outlays at recent rates. But given the
apparent need for sharp increases in capital outlays, the damage caused by
a reduction of federal aid will be magnified (Bernard and Rice, 1983, p.
61).
A number of reasons exist for the increased dependency on federal
aid and the decline in infrastructure support by state and local
governments. One reason is (a) the shift in state and local government
spending priorities from public works and other areas towards social
programs, as well as (b) the increased operating costs of services, such as
police, fire, and education. The second reason is the citizen-imposed tax-
spending limitations. These, combined with sluggish economic growth, have
squeezed government budgets. The effect of the tax revolt is clearly
evident when the state-local expenditures behavior is analyzed on a "before
and after" basis. Table 14 shows that, before the tax revolt, the average
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Table 13
GOVERNMENT CAPITAL INVESTMENT AS RELATED
TO POPULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1960-1982
Total Federal State/Local Total Federal State/Local
(1982 Constant Dollar Per Capita) (Investment as Percentage of GNP)
$126.20
161.10
148.30
128.70
116.90
107.60
114.10
104.80
103.60
93.50
85.50
$17.70
23.70
13.20
15.70
15.10
16.80
18.40
16.40
15.80
15.20
13.30
$108.50
137.40
135.10
113.00
101.80
90.80
95.70
88.40
87.80
78.30
72.20
3.1
3.4
2.9
2.3
2.0
1.8
1.8
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.3
0.4
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
2.7
2.9
2.6
2.0
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.3
1.4
1.2
1.1
Note: Represents annual gross capital formation for nonmilitary, nonresi-
dential structures, based upon value of new construction put in place
adjusted to remove interest payments.
SOURCE: Douglas R. Porter and Richard B. Peiser, 1984, Financing
Infrastructure to Support Community Growth. Washington, DC: Urban
Land Institute, p. 3.
Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
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annual increase in state and local capital expenditures (adjusted for
inflation) was 4.4 percent. After the tax revolt, the average annual
increase was only 0.5 percent. A casual observer might interpret many
state and local tax increases adopted in 1981 and 1982 as the end of the
tax revolt. According to the ACIR, however, evidence suggests a different
interpretation, namely, a major state tax increase in the post-Proposition
13 era is more likely to signal fiscal desperation than that "the big
spenders are once again in office" (ACIR, 1983, pp. 1-3).
The "taxpayer revolt" hypothesis, which vaulted into prominence with
the passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978, predicts that no state
or local politician will lightly propose tax increases to the electorate.
If that is the case, federal tax reductions will add little or no strength
to state-local revenue-raising powers. Indeed the 1978 Proposition 13 in
California was not the point of quelling the tax revolt. The vote of
Californians in June of 1982 to eliminate state inheritance taxes and to
index the individual income tax fully for inflation are only two examples
of a continuing trend. As George Break notes, "If nothing else, these
developments suggest that it is a poor time to expect state and local
governments to undertake fiscal responsibilities" (Break, 1982, p. 47).
Our earlier question was: given an increased responsibility or total
responsibility, will the state or local governments be able and willing to
spend more on infrastructure? The above arguments make it doubtful that
the lower-level governments will provide better public-works services
without than with federal grant-in-aid programs. The norm has been such
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Table 14
STATE-LOCAL EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TAX REVOLT
(Average Annual Percentage Change)
---------------------------------------------------------
Per Capita Expenditures Public Employment
(Adjusted for Inflation) (Per 1,000 Population)
State and Region 1957-1978 1978-1981 1957-1978 1978-1981
-------------------------- ----------------------
Total 4.4% 0.5% 2.7% -1.1%
New England
Connecticut 2.9 0.5 2.2 1.2
Maine 4.7 -1.1 2.6 -0.1
Massachusetts 4.0 -0.1 2.0 -0.5
New Hampshire 3.4 1.1 2.4 -0.9
Rhode Island 5.2 2.1 2.9 -0.6
Vermont 4.5 -1.4 2.9 -0.7
Mideast
Delaware 4.6 2.3 3.4 -0.7
D.C. 7.1 -1.3 5.0 -0.8
Maryland 4.9 -1.4 3.6 -2.2
New Jersey 4.7 1.2 3.0 0.0
New York 4.9 0.2 1.9 1.6
Pennsylvania 4.9 -0.8 2.8 -0.6
Great Lakes
Illinois 4.5 1.0 2.7 -0.6
Indiana 3.6 2.9 2.6 -0.2
Michigan 4.3 0.4 2.7 -3.2
Ohio 4.2 0.7 2.5 -0.2
Wisconsin 4.4 1.9 3.0 -0.1
Plains
Iowa 4.2 0.7 2.6 -0.7
Kansas 3.6 2.0 2.5 0.3
Minnesota 4.5 1.5 2.6 -0.2
Missouri 3.9 3.1 2.9 -0.4
Nebraska 4.7 0.6 3.1 -0.7
North Dakota 3.9 2.4 2.7 0.4
South Dakota 3.8 1.2 2.7 -0.8
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TABLE 14 (CONTINUED)
-----------------------------------------------------------
Per Capita Expenditures Public Employment
(Adjusted for Inflation) (Per 1,000 Population)
State and Region 1957-1978 1978-1981 1957-1978 1978-1981
-------------------------------------------------------------
Southeast
Alabama 4.7 0.5 3.2 -1.1
Arkansas 4.9 1.5 2.9 0.2
Florida 3.9 -1.1 2.4 -3.9
Georgia 4.7 1.5 3.4 -1.4
Kentucky 5.3 1.6 3.1 -1.9
Louisiana 3.4 3.2 2.4 -1.0
Mississippi 5.4 1.4 3.2 -0.4
North Carolina 5.0 0.5 3.5 -0.3
South Carolina 5.1 1.7 3.8 -3.6
Tennessee 5.2 -0.4 3.0 -1.1
Virginia 5.1 1.7 3.6 -2.7
West Virginia 5.7 0.6 3.8 -0.6
Southwest
Arizona 3.9 0.0 3.3 -4.1
New Mexico 3.6 3.6 3.0 1.1
Oklahoma 3.1 4.0 2.5 1.4
Texas 4.1 1.2 3.1 -1.5
Rocky Mountain
Colorado 3.7 -0.4 2.9 -3.5
Idaho 4.0 -1.9 2.5 -2.3
Montana 4.1 -1.3 3.0 -2.1
Utah 4.2 0.4 2.7 -3.9
Wyoming 4.1 6.4 2.4 2.2
Far West
California 4.1 -0.7 1.8 -2.2
Nevada 3.2 -1.0 2.7 -6.2
Oregon 4.5 0.2 2.5 -2.2
Washington 3.9 1.8 2.2 -3.1
Alaska 10.1 14.5 6.2 3.5
Hawaii 5.0 -3.8 2.3 -1.6
D.C. = District of Columbia
SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
1983, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism:
1981-1982 Edition, Washington, DC: Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, p. 2.
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that those areas of infrastructure that have not received federal support
have deteriorated the most by deferred capital and maintenance spending.
Indeed, the deferred spending by states and localities (both new
construction and repair) has resulted in continued use of facilities exceeding their
design life and in the failure to build the infrastructure needed for the
future. Many examples have been offered:
Many of New York City's water mains are far older than
their 60-year life expectancy, and most of Manhattan's
sewers were built during two peak periods: the 1830's
decade and the period from 1870 to 1900 (Grossman, 1979.
pp. 60, 63.)
The Mayor of Indianapolis estimates that 300 miles of his
city's streets should be resurfaced annually as routine
maintenance. In 1981 that city resurfaced 15 miles. At
the same time, resurfacing costs have increased from
$35,000 per mile in 1975 to $63,000 per mile in 1982
(Hudnut, 1983, p. 100).
The most recent estimate by the states and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency projects that the cost to
construct municipal wastewater treatment systems in order
to comply with the Clean Water Act is $118 billion. An
estimated $7.3 billion of that amount is for major sewer-
system repairs and to correct leakages (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1982, pp. 7, 53-54).
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates that it will
cost $11 billion to repair deterioration of the Nation's
inland waterways (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1981).
Thus, the rationale for federal grant-in-aid becomes clear when the
magnitude of infrastructure expenditure needs are juxtaposed against the
existing fiscal dependency of the lower-level governments on the federal
government.
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Federal Capital Spending
Although government investment in nonmilitary capital facilities
rose to $46.6 billion in 1982 from $13.9 billion in 1960, the increase is
not so impressive when those investments are viewed in terms of constant
dollars. When the effects of inflation are eliminated, it is apparent that
investment peaked in 1968 and has fallen steadily ever since (Porter and
Peiser, 1984, p. 2). In constant dollars, as shown earlier in Table 13,
total investment was 44 percent lower in 1982 than in 1968. The decline is
also apparent when investment is compared with population and economic
growth. Investment in public works in 1982 amounted to $85.50 per person,
42 percent lower than in 1970, when it was $143.30 per person. As a
percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP), investment fell from 2.9
percent in 1970 to 1.3 percent in 1982. In public works and other aspects
of government, the federal government is attempting to redefine its role by
applying its limited resources to items considered to be truly of national
interest. At the same time, this administration is encouraging state and
local governments to rely increasingly on private-sector activities. Thus,
although a number of reasons call for greater federal involvement, this
administration has resisted comprehensive infrastructure proposals that
might create a larger federal role.
The data in Tables 15-17 help support the argument that federal
grants do, in fact, translate into tangible state and local infrastructure
investments and that areas not receiving federal aid lag behind. Tables 15
and 16 provide a broad overview of the changes in federal capital-spending
Table 15
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FEDERAL CAPITAL ASSISTANCE
(in millions)
Fiscal Year
Function 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Interstate Highways 4000 4000 4055 4055 2650 3050 3050 3250 3250 3250 3250 3625
Interstate Resurfacing,
Restoration, and Rehabilitation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 175 175 175 175 175
Federal Aid Urban System -- -- 100 100 780 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Bridge Replacement and
Rehabilitationa 
-- -- 100 150 25 75 125 180 180 900 1100 1300
UMTA Section 3 Discretionary
Grants 190 300 310 710 1260 1860 -- -- -- 1375 1410 1515
UMTA Section 5 Formula Grantsb -- -- -- -- -- 300 500 650 775 1515 1580 1665
Waste-Water Treatment -- -- -- 5000 6000 7000 -- -- 4500 5000 5000 5000
Community Development Block
Grant 
-- -- -- -- -- 2500 2950 2950 3500 3650 3750 3675
Local Public Works -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2000 4000 -- -- --
Urban Development Action Grants -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 400 400 675 675
a The Special Bridge Replacement program was authorized through
to include bridge rehabilitation and renamed.
1978. In 1978, the program was expanded
bUMTA Section 5 formula grants may be used for operation or capital purposes at the transit system's
discretion, with the exception of Tier 4 bus purchase funds, which were added to Section 5, 1978.
Tier 4 funds are solely for capital purposes.
SOURCE: George E. Peterson and Mary J. Miller. 1981. Financing Options for Urban Infrastructure.
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
Table 16
OUTLAYS FOR FEDERAL CAPITAL ASSISTANCE
(in millions)
Fiscal Year
Function 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 TQa 1977 1978 1979
Interstate Highways 3173 3330 3342 3269 2909 2804 3306 828 2828 2614 3163
Interstate Resurfacing, Restora-
tion, and Rehabilitation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 23 94 151
Interstate Transfers for
Transit -- -- -- -- 51 66 337 216 392 667 700
Federal Aid Urban Systems -- -- -- 11 35 170 342 109 434 472 640
Bridge Replacement and
Rehabilitation -- -- 3 19 38 46 104 35 131 146 208
UMTA Section 3 Discretionary b
Grants 285 510 864 870 1197 1092 254 1250 1400 1226
UMTA Section 5 Formula Grants -- -- -- -- -- 152 390 55 611 735 1134
Capital Uses of Section 5
Grants -- -- -- -- -- 9 25 7 39 n.a. 251
Waste-Water Treatment -- -- -- 680 1560 1940 2429 918 3545 3194 3741
Community Development Block
Grant -- -- -- -- -- 38 983 439 2089 2464 3161
Local Public Works -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 575 3041 1720
Urban Development Action Grants -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- n.a. n.a.
aTQ = Third Quarter
bOutlays for FY 1965-70: $681 million
n.a. = not available
SOURCE: George E. Peterson and Mary J.
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
Miller. 181. Financing Options for Urban Infrastructure.
u
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TABLE 17
CAPITAL OUTLAYS BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
(millions of dollars)
Function
Fiscal Highways
Year and Bridges
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
$11,888
12,317
11,459
12,152
13,646
14,209
12,497
12,898
15,567
19,133
19,334
Sewers Transit Water
$1,744
2,091
2,428
2,640
3,569
3,955
4,208
4,366
5,619
6,272
6,911
$446
435
920
926
1,203
1,339
1,573
1,407
1,618
1,921
2,617
$1,247
1,343
1,435
1,743
2,111
2,208
2,302
2,141
2,701
3,335
3,784
Note: Deflators were only available for Highways, Sewerage, and
Water, so that no attempt were made to deflate these
figures. Based upon 1971-1972 = 100, in 1981-82, the
highway deflator was 2.314, the sewerage deflator 2.355,
and the water deflator 2.374.
SOURCE: U.S. Joint Economic Committee. 1984. Hard Choices.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 88.
All
Other
$17,812
18,441
19,030
20,623
24,295
24,820
24,574
23,957
27,691
32,238
34,950
U.S.
Total
$33,137
34,627
35,272
38,084
44,824
46,531
45,154
44,769
53,196
62,894
67,596
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priorities. The two sectors (besides highways) that had a surge of federal
capital support in the last half of the 1970s were waste-water treatment
(the nation decided to attack water-pollution problems) and public-transit
systems (UMTA).
The concern with mass transit was largely due to the perceived
national interest in encouraging an energy-savings strategy. Table 16
shows that the changes in legislative grant authorizations have been
translated (of course, sometimes with substantial delays) into
corresponding changes in federal outlays for capital support. The
effectiveness of the grants in shaping capital spending by recipient
governments is visible when we compare data in Table 16 with those in Table
17. The two functions of waste-water-treatment and public-transit singled
out for federal capital assistance have displayed the most rapid overall
investment growth (222 and 263 percent, respectively). Other sectors that
do not receive federal capital assistance, or for which federal capital aid
has grown slowly, have lagged in investment levels.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ROLE
This administration has proposed major cutbacks in federal public-
works grants. For example, on December 29, 1981, a significant course was
set for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's construction grant
program. New amendments reduce the federal government's financial exposure
from $90 billion to $36 billion. Policies on other programs--highways,
wastewater treatment, and water distribution are--briefly discussed below.
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Highways
Before the present Administration, urban portions of the highway
system had the largest growth in federal support. However, the present
administration's policy is to phase out all federal aid for secondary and
urban roads, leaving only strengthened support for the existing interstate
highway system and aid for primary roads. Large urban areas that have been
most dependent on the recent growth in Federal Aid to Urban Systems (FAUS)
will be hurt the most from the new policies.
Federal financing of highways has not kept pace with growing highway
problems. The Highway Trust Fund is supported by a flat tax on gasoline
and various other user taxes and fees, including excise taxes on trucks and
trailers. Because of a slowing of the increase in automobile travel and
improved fuel economy, revenue from the motor fuel tax--the key source of
highway funds--has stopped growing. Motor fuel revenues now account for
one-half of the trust-fund receipts, with the other user charges and
interest income making up the balance (U.S. Department of Transportation,
1983). Peterson and Miller (1981) outline the following effect of the
administration's highway aid proposals on the financing of road
improvements.
The proposals would cut back on plans for building
uncompleted portions of the interstate highway system.
The proposals would reduce the number of lanes, eliminate
planned interchanges and noise barriers, and scrap some
planned urban extensions of the system. These changes would
reduce the cost of building the rest of the interstate
system from the 1981 estimate of $53.8 billion to $31.5
billion.
-54-
Boost still further the share of funds going for
maintenance and reconstruction of the interstate system.
This would be done by creating a new "4R" program, adding
reconstruction projects to the current 3R program
purposes of resurfacing, restoration, and rehabilitation.
The 4R program would devote more federal aid to the
sizable reconstruction needs of older interstate mileage,
by raising the federal share of 4R projects from 75
percent to 90 percent.
Most importantly for local finances, the proposals would
terminate federal assistance for urban arterials and for
secnodary roads, which would be turned over to state and
local government financing responsibility. Federal
assistance for urban and secondary roads would be cut
from $1.6 billion in 1982 to $800 million in 1983 and
zero in 1984 (Peterson and Miller, 1981
p. 21).
The overall effect of major federal expenditures cutbacks cannot be
determined in the immediate future. However, given the history of state
and local government dependency on federal government appropriations, the
future of secondary roads and urban arterials seems to be most bleak in the
regions of highest fiscal stress.
Wastewater Treatment
Current proposals will greatly reduce the level of federal
assistance for wastewater treatment investment. Most of the federal
funding will be concentrated in secondary treatment plants and interceptor
lines needed to treat existing sewer capacity. There will be no funds
available for the expansion, rehabilitation, or improvement of other parts
of existing sewer systems (Peterson and Miller, 1981).
Water Distribution
Although the federal government has adopted safe drinking-water
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regulations, and states and localities are legally obliged to abide by the
set standards, the administration has resisted creating capital programs to
assist in the renewal of water distribution facilities (Peterson and
Miller, 1981).
In the 1980s, to the extent that the national infrastructure problem
will continue to exist, policies for dealing with it may require two types
of tradeoffs: (1) between infrastructure and other national programs, such
as defense expenditures, and (2) between different types of infrastructure.
It is unlikely that individual states or localities will be able to tackle
the massive expenditure requirements for the public-works facilities.
According to Choate (1981), some of the most costly infrastructure includes
highways and bridges outside urban areas, $1 trillion; city streets, $600
billion; municipal water systems, $125 billion; ports and inland waterways,
$40 billion; construction and renovating up to 3,000 prisons and jails, $15
billion; water pollution controls to meet current standards, $100 billion.
Realistically speaking, such an astonishing amount of expenditure is beyond
the collective fiscal potentials of states and localities. Thus, without
sizable federal aid, the repair and rehabilitation of major sectors of
infrastructure will be deferred, sometimes indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have attempted to delineate the underlying reasons
for federal involvement in rectifying the existing infrastructure problems
in the United States. We have stressed the following reasons: (1) equaliza-
tion of intergovernmental and interregional imbalances, (2) response to tax
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base changes, (3) response to recessions, (4) revenue dependency of the
state and local governments.
We argued that, because of a growing vertical fiscal imbalance in
the source of funds in favor of higher levels of government, the federal
government must assume a larger share in financing the multi-billion
infrastructure reconstruction and rehabilitation costs. Also, because the
federal government is predominant in the economy (credit market), states
and localities with limited power to borrow and raise capital should be
helped by the federal government. Interregional differences in the
revenue-raising capacity are yet another reason for aiding the declining
regions. The tax capacity of the states and localities varies, sometimes
substantially. Delegation of heavy capital expenditures to states and
localities with poor or low tax capacity further accentuates their fiscal
crises.
We have also argued that large movements of the tax base can create
inefficiencies, because such movements not only accelerate regional
inequalities, but cause substantial waste when industries close and
production shifts among states. The federal government, by providing a
regional stimulus in the form of grant-in-aid programs, can help stabilize
regional economies and eliminate factors causing tax-base movements, such
as a decaying infrastructure.
Recession, which is national phenomenon beyond the control of
individual states and localities, also creates a need for federal
involvement. By providing public works, the federal government
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historically has generated countercyclical forces in the form of
infrastructure outlays that led the country out of recession.
The past neglect of the public works and the long trend of the state
and local capital expenditures dependency are other reasons for the
inability of lower levels of government to meet the existing infrastructure
expenditures needs on their own.
In brief, the growth of intergovernmental aid has stimulated a debate
between those who support intergovernmental aid and those who point to its
major disadvantages. Among the first group, Break (1980) makes a
persuasive case for intergovernmental aid. He believes that such aid is
needed to mitigate the consequences of benefit spillovers, to redress
fiscal imbalances, to satisfy the unmet needs of lower income groups, to
decentralize political power, to encourage consumption of "merit" goods, to
promote innovation and experimentation, and to help stabilize the economy.
Spillovers prevent cities and states from reaping the full benefits of
their investment in infrastructure; federal grants reduce program costs to
insiders until such costs are roughly equal to the program benefits
insiders enjoy (Break, 1980). On the other extreme, authors, such as Hanke
(1984) and Goldman and Mokuvos (1984), argue for a drastic, if not total,
federal disengagement in public infrastructure. As an alternative, the
latter group propose instead the "privatization" of public-works
facilities.
We argue for a coordinated federal infrastructure engagement policy.
Such a policy would involve the participation of all three levels of the
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government; the policy would emphasize the equalizing power of the federal
government. Given the magnitude of the expenditures requirements for
upgrading and maintaining the nation's capital stock, neither state and
local governments nor the private sector alone can overcome the vast
financial burden of infrastructure investment backlog. The federal
government, in participation with the lower level governments and the
private sector, will eventually have to design and implement a national
infrastructure capital plan. Therefore, the role of federal government,
both as a mediator to equalize interregional disparities in the public
works expenditures, and also, as a fundamental financial source, will
remain important for a long time to come.
APPENDIX I
TAX-BASE OF THE FIFTY STATES, 1982
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TAX-BASE OF THE FIFTY STATES, 1982
Per-Capita Per-Capita Income
State Gov. Finance Tax Revenue (mils.$) Population
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Washington, DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
$ 1239.58
14735.43
1564.56
1068.53
1879.00
1767.92
1663.02
1843.37
2257.42
1387.23
1397.23
1930.66
1298.30
1540.12
1249.78
1582.32
1592.44
1158.41
1742.81
1327.41
1755.13
1681.90
1732.28
1892.24
1231.77
1174.76
1828.91
1601.31
1916.99
1268.40
1727.91
2172.52
2238.07
1213.55
1923.26
1350.55
1797.26
1733.91
1443.72
1662.47
1240.31
1404.99
1141.45
1567.79
1610.86
1499.79
1400.01
1709.73
1330.08
1729.34
3877.90
U.S. Total $96084.7 $63934.73 $2405600 226545386
NOTE: For abbreviations refer to the last page of Appendix I.
$ 762.47
6998.03
1063.55
729.57
1371.16
1191.16
1336.79
1215.74
1923.88
946.25
942.98
1431.28
867.73
1196.56
879.61
1130.41
1054.45
857.02
1105.51
1027.44
1271.44
1351.43
1233.81
1291.68
765.70
846.41
1229.84
1048.75
1271.29
932.94
1346.46
1141.93
1790.82
884.88
1132.02
970.15
1219.02
1113.43
1114.62
1223.42
845.33
917.44
771.12
1081.31
1013.28
1115.33
1030.54
1166.75
954.85
1261.48
2565.67
$ 32198
5667
27256
18467
288481
33256
40164
6640
8542
103502
49797
10823
8574
132675
53147
30362
25762
30836
41001
9669
48929
64248
99314
44087
18749
47682
7458
16346
9782
9350
89788
11324
201823
51494
6725
111179
31771
26526
123096
9676
25457
6056
38957
158431
12619
4497
56191
47557
16352
47579
5738
3893888
401851
2718215
2286435
23667902
2889964
3107576
594338
638333
9746324
5463105
964547
943935
11426518
5490224
2913808
2363679
3660777
4205900
1124660
4216975
5737037
9262078
4075970
2520638
4916686
786415
1569825
800493
920610
7364823 '
1302894
17558072
5881766
652717
10797630
3025290
2633105
11863895
947154
3121820
690768
4591120
14229191
1461037
511456
5346818
4132156
1949644
4705767
469557
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Continued
General
Sales
State (1000 $)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Washington,
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
12074983
2232580
9994415
7744552
105931318
13368525
12337593
2369436
2741402
47705246
20219873
4870602
3570291
43307063
19590534
11183568
9383558
12357932
14151633
4426104
17470943
24031779
35451417
17185475
6568850
19541145
3565876
6395056
9575234
4180601
28037130
5224569
62868106
19786915
2838810
37403739
12057683
11831802
41332721
3208950
10278499
2782307
15500866
66881507
5229663
2133190
21636480
17006546
7020679
16125938
2734274
Parimutual
(1000 $)
143713
0
206558
280470
2048355
213149
519874
89284
0
1712355
0
0
10063
974458
0
0
0
293337
502848
27936
388647
559448
347489
0
0
0
10649
187287
11267
87249
949080
129016
3328754
0
0
395021
0
98034
540694
138531
0
36789
0
0
0
13039
0
205063
250946
0
1508
Motor
Fuel
(1000 Gal-
lons)
2125428
272918
1538950
1364652
11929470
1703256
1411369
321841
189208
5469775
3327640
335745
521374
5119791
3023673
1703627
1481680
2004888
2463538
572246
2087203
2425083
4153193
2203373
1374296
2876292
562119
965158
573750
424407
3508979
892313
5961266
3254477
492252
5295254
2231231
1458560
5040194
390360
1757454
476667
2758583
9598953
795440
251935
2865636
2073755
909870
2289745
464422
Insur- Tobacco
ance (mils. of
(mils.$) packs)
2535
531
2198
1606
23231
2827
3218
710
1558
8778
4499
800
745
10381
4357
2910
1970
2171
4145
969
3766
5102
9743
3862
1722
4482
580
1628
766
937
8731
963
18168
4415
596
8539
2927
2703
10266
1011
2399
526
3706
14516
988
440
3798
3013
2070
4073
396
467
61
317
293
2792
387
359
92
83
1342
731
76
107
1498
808
337
312
771
620
158
560
706
1264
489
318
690
97
185
140
225
935
130
2261
1065
83
1445
456
359
1464
139
431
78
606
1938
112
84
800
450
234
548
78
895447958 14700911 117293289
DC
U. S. Total 206971 29978
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Continued
Amuse-
ment
State (1000 $)
Utility
(1000 $)
Spirits
(1000
gallons)
Beer
(barrels)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Washington,
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
DC
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
178983
34939
313742
156504
9414194
594904
377751
92034
156398
2385048
523638
154290
61123
1528170
351659
250410
174950
275801
447885
71900
529903
793347
1007197
496703
92398
631442
64514
136304
1704006
168777
2350416
133457
5625047
441184
42969
1339015
242454
223822
1182556
81669
197612
67278
458224
1688470
161668
98883
445515
537058
151723
463207
47863
4422797
278798
3166199
2527976
29701915
3457691
3924401
765793
1153799
10803974
6124451
1042288
984131
13829126
6147952
3069708
3101584
3534209
6123773
888773
4487465
6686466
10439098
4010661
2695962
4939129
809521
1531268
929991
956900
10650122
1488177
18051985
5258197
622135
12650215
4390104
2642155
12918257
955844
3183442
565541
5311691
24667143
1490232
455201
5284179
3965105
2016606
4737018
714124
5413
1378
5697
2738
54464
6905
7569
1552
3503
26264
10977
2155
1357
23404
7898
3646
3109
5283
8058
2235
10516
14121
17148
8797
3843
6258
1546
2523
4288
4328
16643
2159
37897
9875
1424
13627
5041
4492
16165
1988
6057
1267
6274
23987
1434
1243
9344
8125
2049
10483
1113
2198152
409609
2786982
1325065
19690171
2703149
1951091
530032
559383
9576431
3687654
1004800
754523
9166614
3973009
2287884
1661895
2350475
3549714
848409
3413912
4816175
6925957
3190257
1644740
3894340
812897
1344287
1003595
1032301
5260353
1234148
12823563
3683335
573808
8548781
2120445
2001321
9938605
754230
2216481
494681
2981338
15343415
780221
437168
3922228
3210648
1219003
5223612
485617
U.S. Total 39149004 264553272 437660 182346504 
508236
Wine
(1000
gallons)
4184
1425
7014
1730
109921
8590
9106
1262
4281
26642
7262
2879
1705
25062
6149
2302
1954
2608
7637
2127
9394
18210
15623
6912
1649
6533
1560
1983
4198
3434
24383
2751
52845
7924
714
14641
3172
8553
17170
3363
3931
743
3950
23836
1231
1605
9179
13697
1672
8841
699
U. S. Total 437660 182346504 508236
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Continued
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Washington,
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Vehicle
License
DC
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
2316209
320719
2085980
1591119
16299376
2182380
2235145
433284
385100
7978824
3605067
561346
663411
6964608
3345254
1926852
1693782
2141104
2539776
757264
2741333
3641141
6390130
2397077
1734173
3297491
491879
1084396
654658
677478
5337632
942972
8992488
3903103
428006
7668931
2039398
1893609
7351333
599687
1959351
486421
2902326
10154386
913773
355051
3625377
2774210
1410893
3036428
397788
State
Hunting Alcohol
License License
Corporate
Licenses
(units)
32533
6675
38921
24391
315910
53376
51151
12019
17548
208391
62304
18667
12590
140450
60620
39668
32354
34112
61455
13472
46795
88562
101151
56057
21402
62297
13071
25158
14498
13038
148306
14882
320201
64967
8704
114768
45559
36490
111945
17305
31971
8203
39269
197474
20273
8837
60883
54696
16949
58645
8791
Auto
Regis.
892925
328082
674973
968732
3019715
1091294
303069
43951
0
938288
1010745
19736
657747
1244539
1047694
790292
573366
953774
911997
471609
297973
312777
2526477
2220538
692093
1416051
570941
426936
250283
227832
335854
402926
1761276
813467
274064
1611718
926523
1096671
2405352
42352
618547
367196
1308783
2921052
677540
277930
1037044
1226023
629922
2260295
450903
150309519 3067754 46329867
2226
1205
4159
1229
25690
5060
5210
926
1168
8163
3359
1840
1017
19932
6392
4822
2296
2209
9489
1298
4880
8004
13100
4187
1261
8405
1673
3052
2364
1084
11516
1604
27770
1528
1233
12294
831
1762
19788
1759
2693
1471
1526
11271
440
1132
2100
2857
1386
14462
958
2183226
197475
1568888
960345
13292130
1834962
2089975
330228
204700
6683102
2980954
523657
525025
5797807
2859296
1650900
1385639
1795321
1990047
537274
2411888
3284368
4966529
2325454
1210909
2534075
444409
798111
504604
657864
4342148
770575
7157121
3427480
377935
6303230
1779558
1451267
5584455
505500
1511576
374656
2752479
7887184
704623
267779
3130043
2281095
779604
2550178
295721
U. S. Total 276081 122763369
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Continued
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Washington,
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
DC
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
State
Personal
Income Tax
(1000 $)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Corporate Farm
Income Resident Property
Tax Property Tax Tax
(mils. $) (1000 $) (mils. ;)
Truck
Regis.
(units)
814210
110005
615409
500738
3512284
634043
131386
77347
11437
1448417
869865
50541
324654
1335112
965312
649022
647487
769327
756593
189434
446589
415446
1163346
895550
362384
847770
296431
396442
184314
103220
436774
395490
937373
1065916
263306
1244021
950847
580040
1033728
72255
428533
225983
569447
3206475
315302
75741
516591
901325
320465
558733
199435
33821895 277049739 142777 3741910034
3151633
1136926
3037167
1680946
31720188
4240774
5437164
861591
1002700
12579727
5257588
1140006
796052
16084047
6145318
3063896
2899321
3122134
5147637
945299
6119056
7661911
10662596
4587557
1802380
5663221
755987
1647318
1271386
1073910
10620303
1294475
23533411
5149688
709280
12592073
3897784
2673264
14026461
972792
2521759
546960
4177783
21979208
1251876
466379
6743029
5719988
1728228
4994098
755464
819173U. S. Total
1719
362
1256
1072
16857
1951
2109
568
516
4753
2882
475
396
7522
3164
1531
1573
2161
3421
518
2054
3614
5136
2504
1082
2735
436
792
379
538
5656
685
12262
3600
385
6474
2467
1284
7668
479
1481
287
2203
13576
739
241
3024
2089
963
2639
499
36097067
9207957
64574307
21453615
669697157
77307694
77173537
11195245
12436455
221786284
73261019
35989419
14087726
152378102
59516215
34822623
27510998
33908976
52385203
18891799
78022169
105966660
122683619
66419433
22156582
56532301
9535448
21677899
17035589
17962865
143610651
18695588
234948785
80479771
5557350
155843325
41781429
51893222
155916565
13118216
36891354
7734789
51919712
215028846
25414667
8662934
87105273
92380450
19253324
67419828
6579992
11341
191
11466
18106
64198
15000
1291
1095
0
18616
12798
2426
11370
55678
29155
60908
28372
14442
15412
992
6644
1075
13708
36389
14500
27381
15773
29798
2510
587
3212
10001
7467
14252
18181
23879
23873
11181
11722
224
5600
12949
13025
79718
7257
1328
10192
14474
3565
19850
6001
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Continued
Com./Ind.
Property Tax
(1000 $)State
Utility
Property
Tax
(1000 $)
Estate
Gift Tax
(1000 $)
Oil & Gas
Severance
(1000 $)
Coal
Severance
(1000 $)
Non-Fuel
Severance
(1000 $)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Washington,
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
DC
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
21840857
7331920
16032845
12837990
195255909
31620945
29840360
7867162
4829689
54033553
36482325
5036218
4881488
95568395
43861033
17816033
20399936
26755986
54273522
6063053
24179695
42711818
76349425
30939011
14019881
34126252
5539919
9423970
4042503
6068983
65262163
9753105
141026809
41570108
5045057
89852286
46024912
17841049
95600002
6170282
17921770
2854592
30485719
200508425
10412835
2783259
36478741
29529067
16921128
34288426
9486162
9564
86
5157
6218
35694
6119
6874
1794
1696
24204
15430
1781
1747
29603
15757
6661
7402
7428
12954
2265
10217
11334
22375
8130
5725
11294
2191
1422
2720
1739
16481
5346
28224
14007
962
26408
10306
4859
31627
1024
8341
1040
3846
46326
2952
911
11329
5421
11734
9421
3320
54619
3836
71302
36620
969778
64574
111459
20707
19606
392976
78601
24150
15923
373776
106502
86658
80847
55721
92788
18136
111101
174807
151008
93922
28799
134813
16303
49346
68785
11807
164799
21410
770665
90612
14386
227633
100308
47554
248543
13455
38460
11960
75646
546616
23383
9178
112398
86643
20193
74209
14287
886202
12566441
10753
749726
9679672
1514876
0
0
0
883375
0
0
0
881173
176485
0
2830514
311279
12321123
0
28
0
1483376
0
1864527
6313
1068045
215880
19389
0
0
4700726
85879
0
1631253
820361
10382304
10
474550
0
0
43809
44733
42611540
819451
0
26913
0
584790
0
4599424
U.S. Total 1849846573 519466 6231608 114294920 
22685831 - 20545709
1133750
13986
207592
5510
0
411541
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1737870
783216
12301
37281
4502989
0
0
122142
0
0
0
0
137028
378359
0
0
0
0
382649
0
0
163131
1167508
155216
0
2638785
0
0
0
214894
352706
500993
0
1350581
69863
4824350
0
1381590
299409
112911
1656568
256389
1612193
626995
56076
3197
0
1223398
717973
46889
300180
389594
215004
218637
256016
206947
417667
35439
171457
89302
1035895
1110126
72685
733774
266594
79557
525900
23294
132410
742887
500353
257258
12977
450229
225044
107843
602650
5138
194473
135673
378752
1724145
773576
50150
263183
172028
75613
112294
868967
22685831 20545709U.S. Total 6231608 114294920
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ABBREVIATIONS AND DATA SOURCE
Abbreviations:
Auto Regis. = Automobile Registration Fees.
Com./Ind. Property Tax = Commercial/Industrial Property Tax.
Mils. = Millions of U.S. Dollars.
Per Capita Gov. Finance = Per Capita Government Finance.
Truck Regis. = Truck Registration Fees.
Data Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
1985, Tax Capacity of Fifty States. M-142. Washington,
DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
pp. 15-44.
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